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CONTESTED ELECTIONS AS SECRET WEAPON: LEGISLATIVE
CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Judy M, Cornett*
Matthew R. Lyon**
I. INTRODUCTION
What does a battle over contested election of judges look like? In
Tennessee, it has taken the form of a battle over summary
judgment. Since 1971, Tennessee has chosen its appellate judges
Pursuant to the "Tennessee Plan,"
through merit selection.1
vacancies on the appellate bench are filled by a process of
application by interested lawyers, nomination of three candidates
by the Judicial Nominating Commission, appointment by the
governor, evaluation by the Judicial Evaluation Commission, and
retention by the voters every eight years thereafter. 2 In these
retention elections, voters vote "yes" or "no" on the question: "Shall
(Name of Candidate)be retained or replaced in office as a Judge of
the (Name of Court)?"3 Because the Tennessee Constitution has
provided since 1835 that "Judges of the Supreme Court shall be
elected by the qualified voters of the State,"4 critics of the Tennessee
Plan have argued that retention elections are unconstitutional, and
that only contested elections can satisfy the constitutional
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assistants, Amanda Morse and Mitchell Panter, Class of 2013, for their outstanding research
assistance.
** Assistant Professor, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law. Thank you
to Danielle Goins, DSOL Class of 2013, for her excellent research assistance.
I See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (2009); Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A Response to
Professor Fitzpatrick:The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501, 509-10 (2008) (describing
the Tennessee Plan for merit selection of appellate judges). Merit selection has been
continuously applicable since 1971 to the judges of the two intermediate appellate courts in
Tennessee, the Court of Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals, but between 1974 and
1994, Supreme Court justices were omitted from the Tennessee Plan. See Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV.
473, 482-83 (2008).
2 See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 482-84.
3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115(b)(1) (2009).
4 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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mandate. 5
Because the legislation authorizing the Judicial Nominating
Commission and the Judicial Evaluation Commission expired on
June 30, 2008,6 proponents of contested judicial elections began
agitating for legislation establishing judicial elections or, in the
alternative, an amendment to the Tennessee Constitution to
provide for retention elections. 7 In 2009, however, the Tennessee
General Assembly passed legislation extending the Tennessee Plan
until June 30, 2012.8 With the Tennessee Plan again set to expire,
the debate over contested elections has begun anew, but with an
additional twist: In January 2011, for the first time since
Reconstruction, the Tennessee General Assembly convened in
Nashville with a Republican majority in both houses. 9 Indeed, early
in the session, a bill was introduced to abolish the Tennessee Plan
and institute contested elections for all appellate judges. 10 The
Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the Senate, Senator Ron
Ramsey, proposed a constitutional amendment to "legitimize" the
Tennessee Plan, fearing the repercussions of "high-spending
political contests" for judges.1 Ramsey's proposal was supported by
5 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 476 (explaining possible unconstitutionality in
selection process and advocating for elections). Professor Fitzpatrick has recently expressed a
preference "to take voters out of the equation altogether and follow a system similar to the
process of appointing federal judges." Blake Farmer, Judicial Selection Critics Wave Caution
Flag on ConstitutionalAmendment, WPLN NEWS (Jan. 25, 2012), http://wpln.org/?p=33376;
see also infra note 13 and accompanying text. This view is in contrast to both his initial 2008
article and a follow-up essay later that year. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 476; Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Errors, Omissions, and the Tennessee Plan, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 85, 109 (2008)
("[Flor better or for worse, the Tennessee Constitution strikes a different balance between
judicial independence and democratic accountability than does the federal constitution.
These differences obviously need to be respected when interpreting the Tennessee
Constitution.").
6 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 485 n.109. The activities of the two commissions would
cease one year from that date, on June 30, 2009. See id. at 485 n.110.
Indeed, Professor Fitzpatrick's article, funded by the Federalist Society, was part of this
effort. See Fitzpatrick, supranote 1, at 473 n.al.
8 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. No. 517.
9 See Andy Sher, New GOP Era Begins in Assembly, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Jan.
10, 2011,
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/201 l/jan/10/new-gop-era-begins-inassembly/. The Republican majority is significant because, for historical reasons, since the
end of Reconstruction, Tennessee appellate judges have been overwhelmingly Democratic.
See infra note 205.
10 S.B. 0699/H.B. 0958, 107th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); see Tom
Humphrey, Adversaries Become Allies to Protect Tennessee Judge Selection Process,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2011, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/06
adversaries -become -allies-to-protect-tennessee/.
11 See Humphrey, supra note 10. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has twice
upheld the constitutionality of retention elections, see White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 51314, 521-22, Ramsey calls these decisions a "wink and nod to the Constitution." Humphrey,
supra note 10.

2011/2012]

Contested Elections as Secret Weapon

2093

both Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam, also a Republican, and
House Speaker Beth Harwell. 12 However, Republican legislators
broke with their leadership to pass a resolution in support of a
constitutional amendment combining the federal advise-andconsent model for nominating judges with the current system of
judicial retention elections. 13 Supporters of the current system have
expressed concern that the constitutional amendment route is
14
simply "a back door way to bring on popular election of judges."
But the battle over contested election for appellate judges cannot
be evaluated in a vacuum. In Tennessee, the issue of contested
elections is part of a much larger issue: legislative power over the
judiciary. Ironically, when Tennessee entered the union in 1796, its
constitution called for complete legislative control over the
judiciary, including election of all judges "by joint ballot of the two
houses of the General Assembly." 15 Legislative power over the
judiciary gradually eroded 16 until, in 1978, the General Assembly
passed a comprehensive reform package which reorganized the
Tennessee trial courts and granted the supreme court greater
rulemaking power. 17 But with the advent of the Republicancontrolled General Assembly, challenges have been raised to the
supreme court's power to appoint the Attorney General' 8 and to the
operation of the Court of the Judiciary, the disciplinary body that
oversees all Tennessee judges, a majority of whose members are
appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court.1 9
This makes
12 Tom Humphrey, Haslam, Harwell, Ramsey Unite Behind Judge Selection Plan,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 2012, http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/jan/25/
haslam-harwell-ramsey-unite-behind-judge-plan.
For the constitutional amendment to be
successful, it would have to garner the support of two-thirds of both houses of the Tennessee
General Assembly in both 2012 and 2013 and a support of the majority of Tennesseans voting
in the next gubernatorial election, in 2014. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
13 See S.J. Res. 0710, 107th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012).
14 Humphrey, supra note 12 (quoting House Democratic Caucus Chairman Mike Turner
(D-Old Hickory)); see also Frank Cagle, Appointing State Appellate Justices Unconstitutional,
METROPULSE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.metropulse.com/news/2012/feb/O1/appointing-stateappellate-justices-unconstitution/.
15 See generally White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 503-04 (discussing legislative power
over the courts).
16 Legislative election of judges continued until adoption of an amendment to the
Constitution in 1853. Id. at 505-06; see also infra Part III.
17 See White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 519. Legislative power over the nominating
process continues, however, as the speakers of both houses of the General Assembly are
empowered to appoint all seventeen members of the Judicial Nominating Commission. See
Fitzpatrick, supranote 1, at 483.
is Tennessee is unique in that its Constitution requires the Supreme Court to appoint the
Attorney General. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
19 See TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 17-5-101 (2009);

see generally Tom Humphrey, Tennessee

Leaders Struggle over Who Judges the Judges, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 2011,
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Tennessee one among many states in which the legislature has
20
openly challenged the power of the judiciary.
An additional line of attack has been opened on individual rulings
of the supreme court. In the 2011 session of the General Assembly,
the majority succeeded in passing legislation overruling two recent
decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court that were seen as
21
excessively pro-plaintiff and thus unfriendly to business interests.
In the first of those decisions, Hannan v. Alltel PublishingCo., 22 the
supreme court interpreted Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56
23
and rejected the federal Celotex standard for summary judgment,
instead requiring that the movant for summary judgment either
"negate an essential element of the [nonmovant's] claim" or "show
that the [nonmovant] cannot prove an essential element of [its case]
at trial" in order to prevail on its summary judgment motion. 24 In
the second decision, Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., the court rejected
the federal McDonnell-Douglas framework for evaluating summary
judgment motions in retaliatory discharge cases, holding instead
that the Hannan summary judgment standard should be applied to
25
those cases.
These two legislative attacks on specific supreme court rulings
could be viewed simply as isolated victories by special interests, or
as discrete instances of legislative dissatisfaction with specific
rulings of the court. Indeed, by flexing its legislative muscle, the
General Assembly might simply be showing its disregard for the
judicial branch; the legislature might be saying that it is the
ultimate arbiter of the law of Tennessee. But this relatively benign
interpretation of the legislature's action overlooks the larger
context. The General Assembly's attempt to control the summary
judgment standard constitutes a broadside attack on the supreme

http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/28/tennessee-leaders-struggle-over-who-judges-the
(discussing the individuals "in charge of [judicial] discipline" in Tennessee); Brandon Gee,
Turf Battle Between Legislature, Judiciary Lies on Horizon in Tenn., TENNESSEAN, Jan. 3,
2012, at 1A.
20 See John Gibeaut, Co-Equal Opportunity, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2012, at 44, 46 ("[B]y 2011, the
number and scope of legislative attacks had grown in dozens of states and covered nearly all
phases of court administration, decision-making and judicial selection.").
21 Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010), superseded by statute, Act of
May 21, 2011, ch. 461, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e)
(2011), 50-1-304(g) (Supp. 2011), 50-1-801 (Supp. 2011)); Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270
S.W.3d 1 (Tenn, 2008), superseded by statute, Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub.
Acts (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16.101 (Supp. 2011)).
22 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 1.
23 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
24 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 9.
25 Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 777.
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court's ability to interpret its own rules. And, by holding contested
elections-the proverbial "sword of Damocles"--over the head of the
supreme court, the legislature dared the court to reinstate the
Hannanstandard by holding the legislation unconstitutional. Thus,
whatever power the General Assembly believes it has to control the
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure is augmented by its
threat to subject the justices of the supreme court and intermediate
appellate court judges to contested elections.
In the remainder of this article, we will explore the role of
summary judgment in the current showdown between the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the General Assembly. In Part II,
we will briefly discuss Public Chapter No. 498. In Part III, we will
explore the constitutionality of the Act repealing Hannan. In Part
IV, we will examine whether the Act exceeds the General
Assembly's statutory rulemaking powers. And in Part V, we will
conclude by restating the larger context, including the political
realities, of the inter-branch battle.

II. PUBLIC CHAPTER No. 498
On the last day of the 2011 regular legislative session, May 20,
the Tennessee General Assembly passed Public Chapter No. 498,
which purported to overrule Hannan by adopting the Celotex
standard for summary judgment. 26 The operative section of the Act
creates a new section of the Tennessee Code Annotated, section 2016-101, which reads as follows:
In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in
Tennessee, the moving party who does not bear the burden
of proof at trial shall prevail on its motion for summary
judgment if it:
(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim; or
(2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party's
evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of
27
the nonmoving party's claim.
The enacted bill contained findings that expressed the
legislature's purpose to overrule Hannan on the basis of its conflict
with federal law and the finding, unsupported by any evidence in

26 Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 2016-101 (Supp. 2011)).
27

TENN. CODEANN. § 20-16-101 (Supp. 2011).
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the legislative history, that "this higher Hannan standard results in
fewer cases being resolved by summary judgment in state court,
increasing the litigation costs of litigants in Tennessee state courts
The enacted bill also
and encouraging forum shopping. .. ,28
provided that "[e]xcept as set forth herein, Rule 56 of the Tennessee
29
Rules of Civil Procedure remains unchanged."
The most obvious question arising from this attempt to either
amend Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 or overrule the
Tennessee Supreme Court's interpretation of it is whether the
enactment is constitutional. 30 The stage is set for the Tennessee
Supreme Court to answer the age-old question: "Who has the power
to prescribe the procedure of the ... courts?" 31 Because there is no
precise federal or state analogue to what has happened in
Tennessee-and because Tennessee's current supreme court is
especially astute and articulate in matters of civil procedure 32-the
constitutional challenge that is sure to come will shed light on the
33
current status of inter-branch power on the state level.
A second question arising from enactment of the new law is
whether the legislature can depart from its own established
processes for amending court rules of practice and procedure. 34 In
Tennessee, as in the federal system, the constitution establishes
only the supreme court, reserving to the legislature the power to
establish inferior courts. 35 Analogous to Congress's enactment of
the Rules Enabling Act, 36 the Tennessee legislature has arguably
delegated rulemaking power for the inferior courts to the Tennessee
Supreme Court: "The supreme court may make rules of practice for
28 Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts. One commentator has mistakenly
asserted that "[t]he preamble did not make it into the final version of the law." Andr6e
Sophia Blumstein, Bye Bye Hannan? What a Difference Two Little Words, at Prial, Can Make
in the Formulation of Tennessee's Summary Judgment Standard, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2011, at
14, 16 n.14.
29 Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, § 2, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
30 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 (3d ed.
2002).
31

Id.

For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently rejected the federal plausibility
pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft u. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), in a strongly reasoned decision. See Webb v. Nashville
Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Tenn. 2011).
33 However, the legislature could be viewed as engaging in an inter-branch game of
"chicken" by using the specter of popular election of Tennessee's appellate court judges,
including the justices of the supreme court, as a deterrent to the court's robust review of the
act.
32

34

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-404 (2009).

35 TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
36

See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2011).
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the better disposal of business before it."37 "The supreme court has
the power to prescribe by general rules the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure in all of the
courts of this state in all civil and criminal suits, actions and
proceedings." 38 "[Such rules] shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right, and shall be consistent with the constitutions
39
of the United States and Tennessee."
Tennessee's process for promulgating the rules of civil procedure
differs from the federal process, however. While Congress has a
negative veto over rules presented to it by the U.S. Supreme
Court, 40 the Tennessee General Assembly must positively approve
by joint resolution the rules presented to it by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 41 Thus, the version of Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Hannan was actually enacted by a majority vote of the General
Assembly in 1971.42
Yet, despite this explicit delegation of rulemaking power to the
Tennessee Supreme Court by the Tennessee legislature, the
Tennessee Supreme Court has referred repeatedly to its "inherent
power" to promulgate rules of practice and procedure. 43 Never
before has the General Assembly attempted to amend a rule of civil
procedure (or, alternatively, to legislatively overrule the Tennessee
Supreme Court's interpretation of a rule of civil procedure); thus,
there is no case that answers the question of whether the
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-401 (2009).
38 Id. § 16-3-402.
39 Id. § 16-3-403.
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2011).
41 TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-404.
42 Tennessee first adopted its rules of civil procedure, modeled on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in 1971, to become effective on January 1, 1971. See TENN. R. CIv. P. 56.
Major amendments to Rule 56 were enacted pursuant to the statutory process in 1993. Id.
Rule 56 was last amended in 2007. Id.
The standard for granting summary judgment in Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is
virtually identical to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Compare TENN. R. Civ. P.
56.04 ("[T]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." (emphasis added)), with FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a) ("The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (emphasis added)).
43 See, e.g., State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn. 2001) ("Only the Supreme
Court has the inherent power to promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure of the
courts of this state."); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1998) ("It is well settled that
Tennessee courts have inherent power to make and enforce reasonable rules of procedure.");
Brewer v. State, 215 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tenn. 1948) (recognizing a trial court's inherent power
to "make rules of practice deemed ... necessary for the proper trial of cases").
37
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legislature can change a rule of civil procedure without following its
own processes for doing so.
The history of the summary judgment standards in Tennessee
prior to Public Chapter No. 498 can provide useful background to
the present examination. An in-depth treatment of those issues and
a discussion of the legislative history of the enactment itself can be
44
found elsewhere.
III. IS THE ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?

The legislative caption to Public Chapter Number 498 indicates
that its purpose was to overrule the Tennessee Supreme Court's
45
interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in Hannan.
The language now codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2016-101 goes beyond that stated purpose and appears to overrule the
language of Rule 56 itself.46 Even if, however, the legislation only
overrules Hannan, it is open to a constitutional challenge on
separation of powers grounds. A review of the history of relevant
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution, as well as like provisions
in other jurisdictions, suggests that such a challenge may have
merit.
A. Separationof Powers Under the Tennessee Constitution
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Tennessee
47
Constitution contains an explicit separation of powers clause.
Article II, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that
"[t]he powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct
departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial" 48 while
article II, section 2 states that "[n]o person or persons belonging to
one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others," except as otherwise permitted in
the constitution. 49 This language was not present in the original

44 See generally Judy M. Cornett & Matthew R. Lyon, Redefining Summary Judgment by
Statute: The Legislative History of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-16-101, 8.1 TENN.
J.L. & POLY 100 (2012).
45 Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts ('WHEREAS, the purpose of this
legislation is to overrule the summary judgment standard for parties who do not bear the
burden of proof at trial set forth in Hannan v. Alltel PublishingCo., its progeny, and the cases
relied on in Hannan.").
46 Cornett & Lyon, supra note 44, at 130-31.
47 TENN. CONST. art. II, § 2.
48 Id. art. II, § 1.
49 Id. art. II, § 2.
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1796 version of the Tennessee Constitution.5 0 That document, like
the North Carolina Constitution upon which it was based,
subjugated the judicial branch to the legislative branch by providing
in Article V, section 1 that "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be
vested in such superior and inferior courts of law and equity, as the
legislature shall, from time to time, direct and establish."5 1 Judges
52
were elected by the General Assembly and served at its pleasure.
Although Tennessee courts, at times, spoke of the principle of the
separation of powers in glowing terms,5 3 they were, for all intents
and purposes, beholden to the legislature.5 4 This situation was
untenable; "[c]ompetence and independent thought suffered to such
an extent that ... a complete overhaul of the judicial system was
necessary."55
To this end, the delegates to the 1834 Tennessee constitutional
convention agreed both to incorporate the aforementioned sections
50 See WALLACE MCCLURE, STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO
TENNESSEE 44 (1916).
51 See LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 3
(1990) (quoting TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. V, § 1.); see also Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10
Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 601 (1831) (citing the power of the legislature to create courts under the
constitution); JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
TENNESSEE 148-49 (2d ed. 1907) (characterizing this as "one of the most defective and illconsidered of [the] provisions" of the 1796 Constitution and observing that "[it should have
been plain to anyone ... that a court created by the Legislature and subject to abolition in the
same manner, was not an independent body, and certainly not co-ordinate with the lawmaking power").
52 LASKA, supra note 51, at 4; see also White & Reddick, supra note 1, at 504 (observing
that, under the 1796 Constitution, "courts only existed if, and when, and as long as the
legislature desired" and that "the legislature maintained the power to abolish the supreme
court since it was not created by the constitution").
53 In Cooper, for example, Judge Jacob Peck expounded upon separation of powers
principles as follows:
The framers of the constitution never dreamed of admitting the exercise of arbitrary
power in any department of the government. The legislative, the executive and the
judicial departments are three lines of equal length, balanced against each other, and
the framework, forming an equilateral triangle, becomes stronger the more its parts are
pressed. Like the foundation of our religion, the trinity, it is the key on which the whole
arch rests. The people have erected it; they have seen its suitability for duration, and
compared its proportions with the external view of the pyramid, whose age is untold, and
which alone, of all the works of man, has withstood the ravages of time.
Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 611.
54 See LASKA, supra note 51, at 8. Lewis Laska indicates that:
Legislative control of the judiciary in general was the cause of many of the court system's
deficiencies. Frequent legislative modifications of the system served only to exacerbate
the problems. The threat of politically motivated impeachment continually hung above
the judges' heads [and] unsuccessful litigants commonly turned to the general assembly
seeking legislative redress through private acts, an early fixture in Tennessee statutory
law.
Id.
55 Id. at 64.
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regarding the separation of powers and to vest the judicial powers
"in one Supreme Court, in such Inferior Courts as the Legislature
shall from time to time ordain and establish .. .. "56 Together,
Article II, sections 1 and 2 and Article VI, section 1 of the 1835
constitution establish the judiciary as an independent branch of
government in Tennessee, one "which cannot easily be manipulated
and controlled by the legislature, and which serves as a check upon
its power."57 In the years following the adoption of the 1835
constitution, Tennessee courts repeatedly stressed the vitality of the
separation of powers doctrine and the importance of maintaining
the integrity of the branches of government. 58 The constitution,
however, left two key issues unaddressed: the scope of the judicial
powers and the methods available to the courts to protect those
powers.
First, although Article II, sections 1 and 2 of the Tennessee
Constitution and the cases interpreting those sections make clear
that the judicial branch is an independent department of the
government and that the legislative and executive branches are not
to usurp its powers, the provisions are silent on the extent of the
judicial powers. 59 Thus, it was left to the courts to consider their
scope. In one early case, the Tennessee Supreme Court quoted
56 TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. VI, § 1. Note, however, that the decision to broaden the
independence of the judicial branch was not unanimous; Newton Cannon, who would serve as
Tennessee's Governor from 1835 to 1839, and was "one of the leading members of the [1834]
Convention," made a motion to restore the language of article V, section 1 of the 1796
Constitution, which nineteen other delegates supported. See CALDWELL, supra note 89, at
203-04.
57 LASKA, supra note 51, at 111 (citing Miller v. Conlee, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 432, 433
(1858)); see CALDWELL, supra note 51, at 197. However, the legislature retained the
responsibility for electing judges until 1853. MCCLURE, supranote 50, at 54-55.
58 See, e.g., Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664, 670 (Tenn. 1910) ("[T]he powers that are
committed by the people to one branch cannot be exercised by those performing duties in
another without express authority to do so, or the exercise of such powers becomes essential
or appropriate to the effective discharge of the duties imposed upon such branch.") (quoting
Overshiner v. State 59 N.E. 468, 469 (Ind. 1901)); Mabry v. Baxter, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 682,
689 (1872) ("It is essential to the maintenance of republican government, that the action of
the legislative, judicial and executive departments should be kept separate and distinct, as it
is expressly declared it shall be by the Constitution, Art. 2, secs. 1 & 2. The most responsible
duty devolving upon this court is to see that this injunction of the Constitution shall be
faithfully observed."); State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 634, 654 (1856) ("[Elach
department is limited within its own appropriate sphere. To each has been delegated by the
people-whose agents they are-such portion of sovereignty as was deemed expedient ....
[N]either can assume the exercise of any of the powers conferred upon either of the others...

59 See Richardson, 125 S.W. at 668 ("The Constitution does not define in express terms
what are legislative, executive, or judicial powers."); see also discussion infra, of other state
constitutional provisions that expressly designate certain powers and responsibilities to the
judicial branch.
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Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court for
the proposition that "the difference between the departments,
undoubtedly is, that the legislator makes, the executive executes,
and the judiciary construes the law."60 Broadly, this means that
"[t]he legislative branch has the authority to make, alter, and repeal
the law; the executive branch administers and enforces the law; and
the judicial branch has the authority to interpret and apply the
law."6 ' The courts also enjoy certain inherent powers necessary to
carry out their judicial function, including, but not necessarily
limited to, the power to enforce their judgments 62 and to promulgate
rules governing their own practice and procedure. 63 As discussed
below, 64 this power to develop and enact rules of procedure
governing the courts has been recognized by the General
Assembly. 65 The power of the courts to promulgate necessary
procedural rules however, "exists by virtue of the establishment of a
court and not by largess of the legislature."66 In other words, the
rulemaking power recognized by the legislature does not necessarily
define the scope of that power, which derives from a state
constitution "which, by necessity, grants all powers necessary to
67
engage in the complete performance of the judicial function."
Relying upon their inherent powers, and looking to Chief Justice
Marshall's seminal opinion in Marbury v. Madison,6 Tennessee
courts have used the power of judicial review to strike down laws
69
that unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary.
6o Mabry, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) at 690 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 46 (1825)).
61 Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995) (citing TENN.
CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993));
accord Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 843 n.8 (Tenn. 2008) (citing
Richardson, 125 S.W. at 668); State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting
Brackett, 869 S.W.2d at 939); Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)
(citing Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 453; Richardson, 125 S.W. at 668; Brackett, 869 S.W.2d at
939).
62 See, e.g., Chaffin v. Robinson, 213 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Tenn. 1948); Osgood Co. v. Bland, 141
S.W.2d 505, 506 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).
'3 See Chaffin, 213 S.W.2d at 34; Osgood Co., 141 S.W.2d at 506-07; see also State v. Reid,
981 S.W.2d 166, 170 (1998) (recognizing Tennessee court's "inherent power to make and
enforce reasonable rules of procedure" (citations omitted)).
64 See discussion infra Part IV.
65 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -402 (2009); Reid, 981 S.W.2d at 170.
66 Haynes v. McKenzie Mem'l Hosp., 667 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Court v. Judges of 28th Judicial Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978)).
67 Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Court, 579 S.W.2d at 877.
68 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
69 In denying a petition to rehear in Biggs v. Beeler, 173 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1943), Justice
Alexander Chambliss wrote that beginning with Marbury,
in which Chief Justice Marshall sailed an uncharted sea, and, citing no authority, relied
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This is not to say the courts have exercised this power with relish or
abandon. To the contrary, Tennessee's courts have displayed
70
caution in finding a legislative act unconstitutional for any reason,
but particularly due to a perceived violation of the separation of
powers.7 1 This hesitance is due to several factors. First, the courts
understand that their own autonomy and power as a co-existent
branch of government depends upon the recognition of the power of
the other branches within their own spheres.7 2 Second, "it is
impossible to preserve perfectly the theoretical lines of demarcation
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government." 73 Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently
alone on principle and reason, our Courts have not hesitated to strike down legislative
action which disregarded, transgressed and defeated, either directly or indirectly,
mandates of the organic and fundamental law laid down in the Constitution. This in the
performance of their sworn duty, undeterred by clamor or criticism.
Id. at 948; see also Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203, 209-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing cases
in which the courts held statutes "unconstitutional and void" (citations omitted)).
70 See, e.g., Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Tenn. 2009) ("Our charge is to uphold the
constitutionality of a statute wherever possible. 'In evaluating the constitutionality of a
statute, we begin with the presumption that an act of the General Assembly is
constitutional."' (citing and quoting State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tenn. 2007)).
71 See Tenn. Envtl. Council v. Water Quality Control Bd., 250 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tenn. 2007)
("[T]he courts are required by the separation of powers doctrine to respect the General
Assembly's considerable legislative discretion, and to presume that legislative actions are
constitutional." (citation omitted)). But see Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Court, 579 S.W.2d at
878 ("[T]he separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, imposes on the judicial
branch not merely a [n]egative duty not to interfere with the executive or legislative branches,
but a positive responsibility to perform its own job efficiently. This positive aspect of
separation of powers imposes on courts affirmative obligations to assert and fully exercise
their powers, to operate efficiently by modern standards, to protect their independent status,
and to fend off legislative or executive attempts to encroach upon judicial prerogatives.").
72 In an opinion written at the turn of the twentieth century, the state supreme court
wrote:
In the division of the powers of the three separate and co-ordinate branches of the
government certain powers are confided to each, and the judiciary has no more right or
warrant to invade and usurp the powers vested in either of the other branches of the
government than have the other branches the right to invade and usurp the powers
confided to the judicial department of the government; and to do so would be to violate
that provision of the constitution so earnestly relied upon by the defendant,-that the
three departments of the government are separate and distinct. And, on the other hand,
if the court should permit itself to be influenced in the slightest degree by what had been
said or done in political conventions, or what had been said and done in obedience to
public opinion, in its investigation of and construction of the constitution, it would tend
to destroy its own independence, which, in its own sphere, is as absolute and as much
protected and guarded in the constitution as is that of the other departments in their
respective spheres. It is only by remembering the limits of the power confided to the
judicial department of the government and respecting the independence of the other
departments, that the judiciary can maintain its own independence in the proper sense
of the term ....

State ex rel. Robinson v. Lindsay, 53 S.W. 950, 951-52 (Tenn. 1899).
13 Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. 1975) (citing Bank of Commerce & Trust
Co. v. Senter, 260 S.W. 144, 151 (Tenn. 1924); Richardson v. Young, 125 S.W. 664 (Tenn.
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observed that "the Constitution of Tennessee does not prohibit the
three branches of government from cooperating with each other,"
and that, in fact, "[tihe public welfare demands cooperation between
the legislative and judicial branches of our government, and an
avoidance of unnecessary controversies between them. '74 Given
these restrictions on the use of judicial review, it is instructive to
briefly survey the cases in the modern era in which Tennessee
courts have exercised the power to preserve their ability to enact
rules of practice and procedure, as well as circumstances in which
the courts have deferred to the legislature.
1. Cases Asserting Power in the Judicial Branch
One area in which the separation of powers issue has arisen is in
the regulation of attorneys.
In Belmont v. Board of Law
Examiners,75 the petitioner, who had previously failed the
Tennessee bar examination four times, was denied the opportunity
to sit for the exam a fifth time by the Board of Law Examiners, an
administrative arm of the Tennessee Supreme Court, pursuant to a
supreme court Rule. 76 His petition for writ of certiorari to the
Tennessee Supreme Court argued that the court's rule was
rendered null and void by a statute that prohibited any state
licensing agency from enforcing a rule or regulation limiting the
number of times that an otherwise qualified person could sit for a
licensing examination.7 7 The court held that the statute could apply
to boards, commissions, and agencies that are supervised by the

1910)); see also State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tenn. 1998) ("[B]ecause the defining
powers of each department are not always readily identified, recognizing an encroachment by
one department upon another is sometimes difficult." (quoting Summers v. Thompson, 764
S.W.2d 182, 189 (Tenn. 1988)); House v. Creveling, 250 S.W. 357, 359 (Tenn. 1923)
(recognizing the difficulty in preserving the "theoretical lines" between the branches of the
government).
74 In re Bell, 344 S.W.3d 304, 314 n.13 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Petition for Rule of Court
Activating, Integrating & Unifying the State Bar of Tenn., 282 S.W.2d 782, 787 (Tenn. 1955)).
Bell referred specifically to the statute creating the Court of the Judiciary, which investigates
and determines sanctions for misconduct by Tennessee judges. Id. at 313. While promoting
the Court of the Judiciary as an example of inter-branch cooperation, the court also reiterated
that the General Assembly has recognized that it is the court that "has 'general supervisory
control over all the inferior courts of the state' . . . and that this inherent, plenary power
derives from the common law and not from the General Assembly." Id. at 313 (quoting TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-501 to -503 (2009)). The recent controversy over the Court of Judiciary in
Tennessee is discussed further infra, Part IV.
75 Belmont v. Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1974).
76 Id. at 462.
77 Id. at 462-63 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1902 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. §
4-19-102 (2011)).
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legislature, but that an amendment to the statute that specifically
applied it to the Board of Law Examiners, 78 an agency of the judicial
branch, was unconstitutional. 79 The court relied heavily upon a
then-recent decision by the Tennessee Court of Appeals,8 0 in which
the intermediate appellate court had written that the "supreme
judicial and judicial supervisory power is an inherent power of the
supreme court and has been so recognized by the legislative branch
of our government,"8 1 and that '[i]f the matter of admission of an
attorney to the bar is an exercise of a judicial power, that power lies
with the supreme court and constitutionally cannot be interfered
with by the legislative department of the tripartite government of
this State."'8 2 Having held the application of the statute to the
Board of Law Examiners unconstitutional on separation of powers
83
grounds, the court dismissed the petition.
After Belmont, the supreme court addressed whether the
Tennessee Board of Dentistry, an administrative board responsible
for licensing, regulating, and disciplining Tennessee's practitioners
of dentistry, had the power to consider the constitutionality of a
statute assessing civil penalties.8 4 Citing cases from other
jurisdictions, the court observed that it is "widely recognized" that
"[a]n agency is not authorized to consider or question the
constitutionality of a legislative act; nor may it declare
unconstitutional the statutes which it was created to administer or
enforce."8 5 The basis for this general rule in Tennessee is the
separation of powers provisions in the state constitution and the
fact that, since Marbury v. Madison, "it has been the sole obligation
of the judiciary to interpret the law and determine the

78

See 1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1293.

79 Belmont, 511 S.W.2d at 464.

80 Cantor v. Brading, 494 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). That case involved an action
by former lawyers who had been permanently disbarred and sought a decree of reinstatement
pursuant to a statute enacted by the General Assembly in 1971. Id. at 139 (citing TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-201 to-204 (repealed March 30, 2000)). The Court of Appeals held that
admission of attorneys to the bar falls within the inherent powers of the judicial branch, and
that the statute violated the separation of powers clause by "strip[ping] the Supreme Court of
its right to exercise its inherent power to consider the qualifications of a formerly disbarred
person and to determine whether to grant him a license and admit him to practice law again."
Cantor,494 S.W.2d at 145.
81 Belmont, 511 S.W.2d at 463 (quoting Cantor,494 S.W.2d at 142).
82 Belmont, 511 S.W.2d at 463 (quoting Cantor, 494 S.W.2d at 141).
83 Belmont, 511 S.W.2d at 464.
84 Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Tenn. 1995). The Board had
held that "it was without jurisdiction to consider federal or state constitutional challenges to
the statute or its application .. " Id. at 450-51.
85 Id. at 452.
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constitutionality of actions taken by the other two branches of
government."8 6 Ultimately, the court clarified that "[t]he facial
constitutionality of a statute may not be determined by an
administrative tribunal in an administrative proceeding," but that
an agency may initially rule on an 'as applied' challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute" and "may address a claim that an
agency's procedure is constitutionally deficient."87 Following the
principles set forth in Richardson, the court recently interpreted a
provision of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.8 8 The
court held that, to the extent the provision required a petitioner to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing a declaratory
judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a statute on its
89
face, the provision violated separation of powers principles.
The court's most emphatic statement regarding the separation of
powers in recent years is its 2001 decision in State v. Mallard.90 In
Mallard, the court considered a statute that set forth several
enumerated factors for courts to consider, "in addition to all other
logically relevant factors," when "determining whether a particular
object is drug paraphernalia as defined by [Tennessee Code
Annotated section] 39-17-402."'9 One of the factors to consider was
"[p]rior convictions, if any, of the owner or of anyone in control of
the object for violation of any state or federal law relating to

controlled substances ....

."92

The lower courts had held that by

requiring courts to consider prior convictions as evidence, the
statute directly conflicted with Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b),
which stated that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity with the character trait" except in certain
circumstances. 93 Justice William M. ("Mickey") Barker, writing for
a unanimous court, engaged in an extended discussion of the
separation of powers clause and the power granted to the judiciary
94
by the Tennessee Constitution.
The court observed that, while it may consent to the legislature's

8 Id. at 453 (citing Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Tenn.
1993)).
87 Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 454-55.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-225 (2011).
89 Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 845-46 (Tenn. 2008).
88

90 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473 (Tenn. 2001).
91 Id. at 479 n.4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-424 (1997)).
92 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-424(2).
93
94

Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 480 (quoting TENN. R. EVID. 404(b)).
See id. at 475, 480-83.
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enacting rules of evidence from time to time, "any exercise of that
power... must inevitably yield when it seeks to govern the practice
and procedure of the courts," because "[o]nly the supreme court has
the inherent power to promulgate rules governing the practice and
procedure of the courts of this state."95 For any other branch of
government to exercise this power would violate article II, section 2
of the Tennessee Constitution, as "[tihe court is supreme in fact as
well as in name." 96 Although Tennessee courts have, from time to
time, agreed to rules of procedure or evidence promulgated by the
legislature where such rules "(1) are reasonable and workable
within the framework [of] the judiciary, and (2) work to supplement
the rules already promulgated by the supreme court," 97 this consent
by the courts has been "purely out of considerations of inter-branch
98
comity and is not required by any principle of free government."
This "courtesy does not extend to the surrendering of judicial
power," because the judicial branch has 'an imperative duty ...to
protect its jurisdiction at the boundaries of power fixed by the
constitution.' 99 Crucially, the court then stated as follows:
Just as the General Assembly has no constitutional power to
enact rules that infringe upon the protections of the
Declaration of Rights, the legislature can have no
constitutional authority to enact rules, either of evidence or
otherwise, that strike at the very heart of a court's exercise
of judicial power. Among these inherent judicial powers are
the powers to hear facts, to decide the issues of fact made by
the pleadings, and to decide the questions of law involved.
As an essential corollary to these principles, any
determination of what evidence is relevant, either logically or
legally, to a fact at issue in litigation is a power that is
entrusted solely to the care and exercise of the judiciary.
Indeed, a "court's constitutional function to independently

95 Id. at 480-81. This language from Mallard has been quoted on many occasions by
Tennessee courts, including in two recent Supreme Court decisions. See Keough v. State, 356
S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tenn. 2011) (citing inherent power as authority for adopting Supreme Court
Rule pertaining to procedure in post-conviction cases); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for
Humanity, 346 S.W.3d 422, 436 (Tenn. 2011) (using Mallard as authority for determination
that "such a broad and sweeping change" as adoption of the federal pleading standard set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal "should come by operation of the normal rule-making process, not
by judicial fiat in the limited context of a single case").
96 Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 481 (quoting Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1976)).
97 Id. at 481.
98 Id. at 482.
9 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Shepherd v. Neb. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, 557 N.W.2d 684,
693 (Neb. 1997)).
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decide controversies is impaired if it must depend on, or is
limited by, another branch of government in determining
and evaluating the facts of the controversies it must
adjudicate." Consequently, any legislative enactment that
purports to remove the discretion of a trial judge in making
determinations of logical or legal relevancy impairs the
independent operation of the judicial branch of government,
and no such measure can be permitted to stand. 10 0
Despite this strong language, the court did not strike down
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-424 as an unconstitutional
violation of separation of powers. 10 1 Instead, mindful of its duty to
construe legislative enactments as constitutional if at all possible,
the court concluded that, despite the clear statement in the statute
that courts "shall consider" certain factors, the statute only
suggested, rather than required, trial courts to consider the factors
and thus it supplemented, rather than impaired, the Rules of
Evidence. 10 2 Mallard is not remembered, however, for this strained
construction of a statute helping define the term "drug
paraphernalia," but rather for the court's expansive view of the
judicial powers that preceded it.
The quoted paragraph from Mallard represented a clear
extension of the court's definition of the judicial powers beyond
previous cases, at least in the modern era. It is notable that, until
reaching this point in the opinion, the court had relied primarily
upon Tennessee case law. 0 3 In this paragraph, however, the court
chose to cite primarily persuasive authority from other jurisdictions,
10 6 and New Hampshire. 10 7
including Nebraska, 10 4 Illinois, 0 5 Texas,
This suggests the adoption of a new standard in Tennessee.
Moreover, although the Mallard court leaned heavily upon a
Tennessee case, Anderson County Quarterly Court, for general
language regarding courts' inherent powers, that case took a much
more restrictive view of the term "inherent judicial powers."' 0 8

100 Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
101 Id. at 484-85.
102 Id.
at 483-84.
103 See id. at 473-82.
104 State ex rel. Shepherd v. Neb. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, 557 N.W.2d 684, 693 (Neb.
1997).
105 People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. 1977).
106 Morrow v. Corbin, 62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex. 1933).
107 Opinion of the Justices, 688 A.2d 1006, 1016 (N.H. 1997).
108 See Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Ct. v. Judges of 28th Jud. Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875, 878
(Tenn Ct. App. 1978).
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Specifically, the court of appeals had stated in Anderson County
Quarterly Court that "[i]nherent powers consist of all powers
reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its
judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity,
and to make its lawful actions effective," and that the inherent
powers doctrine has been used primarily, but not exclusively, to
secure "relatively minor fiscal expenditures necessary for the courts
to operate."10 9 It is a significant step from this definition of
"inherent powers" to the much broader description of those powers
in Mallard: "the powers to hear facts, to decide the issues of fact
made by the pleadings, and to decide the questions of law involved,"
and "[a]s an essential corollary to these principles, any
determination of what evidence is relevant, either logically or
legally, to a fact at issue in litigation ... ."110 It is not surprising,
therefore, that Professor Don Paine1 1' wrote in the weeks following
Mallard that the opinion "may contain the most significant
procedural development I have witnessed since licensure almost 40
years ago. This precedent will be cited for years to come in
2
constitutional attacks on statutes."11
2. Cases Deferring to the Legislative Branch
Although the court has, on occasion, taken a broad view of its own
powers, it has also, when appropriate, deferred to the legislature to
create policy in the area of judicial practice and procedure. In
Underwood v. State,113 for example, a defendant found not guilty of

109 Id. at 879 (citations omitted). The specific examples given by the court of appeals of
circumstances in which courts have exercised their inherent powers included fixing the
amount of salaries or the time at which a salary increase would take place, hiring employees,
and controlling courthouse space. Id. (citations omitted).
110 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tenn. 2001).
111 Don Paine has served as Reporter to the Tennessee Supreme Court Advisory
Commission on Rules of Practice and Procedure, President of the Tennessee and Knoxville
Bar Associations, a named partner in a Knoxville civil litigation firm, and a Professor of Civil
Procedure at the University of Tennessee College of Law. See Donald F. Paine, PAINE,
TARWATER & BICKERS, LLP, http://www.painetarwater.comlattorneys/paine.php, (last visited
June 10, 2012).
112 Donald F. Paine, Separation of Powers and the 'Mallard'Decision, TENN. B.J., Dec.
2001, at 24. Prof. Paine noted in a recent Tennessee Bar Journal article that "reread[ing]"
Mallard would be key to determining the constitutionality of Public Chapter Number 498.
Donald F. Paine, Can the GeneralAssembly Overrule Supreme Court Rules?, TENN. B.J., Dec.
2011, at 37 ("In a 'whereas' clause the lawmakers expressly stated that their purpose was to
,overrule' Hannan. Can they do that? I don't know, but I reckon it will take a Tennessee
Supreme Court opinion to resolve the issue.").
113 Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. 1975).
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a criminal offense sought to have his criminal records expunged. 114
The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition on
grounds that the expungement statute was unconstitutional. 115 The
defendant appealed, and the supreme court held that the
expungement statute did not violate the separation of powers
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution because it was "[a]
legislative enactment which does not frustrate or interfere with the
adjudicative function of the courts," and thus "does not constitute an
impermissible encroachment upon the judicial branch of
116
government."'
In Newton v. Cox," 7 the court clarified that its power to regulate
the legal profession in Tennessee did not preclude the legislature
from passing reasonable restrictions on the practice.11 8 The statute
in question, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-120, limited
contingency fees for plaintiffs' attorneys in medical malpractice
actions to one-third of the award." 9 One plaintiffs attorney in a
medical malpractice case had neglected to tell his client about the
statute while simultaneously charging him a fifty percent
contingency fee. 120 The client, after learning of the statute, sued the
attorney, who argued that the statute violated separation of powers,
among other provisions of the state constitution.'12 Although the
trial court agreed with the attorney, 22 the supreme court
reversed. 123 With regard to the separation of powers issue, the court
held that the statute did not "directly conflict with the supreme
court's authority to regulate the practice of law" and instead was a
legitimate "exercise of the legislature's police powers, intended to
124
protect the public."'
In State v. King, 25 the court granted King permission to appeal
an order to address the constitutionality of a statute 26 that
required trial courts to instruct juries regarding parole and release

Id. at 46.
Id. (interpreting TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4001 to -4004 (current version at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-32-101 to -104 (2006 & Supp. 2011))).
116 Underwood, 529 S.W.2d at 47.
117 Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994).
118 Id. at 112.
119 Id. at 107 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (1976)).
120 Newton, 878 S.W.2d at 106-07.
121 Id. at 107.
114
115

122

Id.

123

Id. at 112.

124

Id.

125

State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1998).

126

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35,201(b)(2) (Supp. 1994).
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eligibility when either party requested such an instruction. 27 King
argued that this statute violated the separation of powers because it
"improperly encroache[d] upon the judicial function of determining
the law appropriate for jury consideration in each case."1 28 The
court conceded that "the statute constitute[d] an overlapping of the
legislative power with that of the judiciary"; however, "having
already acknowledged the authority of the legislature to provide a
range of punishment instruction," the court concluded that
requiring an explanation to the jury "of the reality of early release
and parole is no further an encroachment into the judicial
function." 129 Because "[t]he jury must still decide the issue of guilt
or innocence, and the trial court must still decide the ultimate
sentence to be imposed," the court determined that Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-201(b)(2) did not violate the separation of
powers clauses of the Tennessee Constitution. 130
In the years since Mallard, the separation of powers issue has
arisen most often in the context of workers' compensation law, an
area highly regulated by statute but over which the courts also have
significant authority.1 31 In Martin v. Lear Corp.,132 the issue was
whether a workers' compensation claimant could introduce the
testimony of a physician who had examined him at the employer's
request.1 33 The resolution of this issue required the court to
consider the interaction of a workers' compensation provision1 34 and
a rule of civil procedure.1 35 The employer, citing the procedural rule
127
128

King, 973 S.W.2d at 587.
Id. at 589.

Id.
Id.
131 Tennessee's workers' compensation law is found in Tennessee Code Annotated sections
50-6-101 to -801. Interestingly, workers' compensation cases in Tennessee are appealed
directly from the trial court to the Tennessee Supreme Court, rather than funneling through
the intermediate Court of Appeals like other civil cases. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225(e)(1)
(2008). The Tennessee Supreme Court has established a Special Workers' Compensation
Appeals Panel to hear the majority of such appeals, with the Panel's opinions subject to the
review of the full court. Id. § 50-6-225(e)(3) & (5)(A); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 51. A discussion of
recent changes to Tennessee's workers' compensation law can be found infra, Part IV.
132 Martin v. Lear Corp., 90 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2002).
129
130

133Id. at 628.
134 Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204 (f) (1999) ("Any physician whose services are
furnished or paid for by the employer and who treats or makes or is present at any
examination of an injured employee may be required to testify as to any knowledge acquired
by such physician in the course of such treatment or examination as same relates to the
injury or disability arising therefrom.")).
135 Id. (quoting TENN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(4)(B) ("A party may not discover the identity of, facts
known by, or opinions held by an expert who has been consulted by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not to be called as a witness at
trial except as provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
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that protects from discovery the opinion of a consulting expert who
will not be called as a witness, claimed that the workers'
compensation statute suggesting otherwise violated separation of
powers principles. 136 The court held that it did not for two reasons:
first, because the statute did not impermissibly conflict with Rule
26.02, but merely limited its application in certain circumstances;
and second, because the General Assembly "is the appropriate body
to set the policy that governs workers' compensation cases," and the
statute is consistent with the remedial nature of the workers'
137
compensation system.
Four years after Martin, the court in Lynch v. City of Jellico13s
addressed whether the administrative benefit review process
established by statute violated Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee
Amendments to the Tennessee workers'
Constitution. 139
compensation statute in 2004 established that, prior to filing suit
against their employer, workers' compensation claimants must first
submit to an administrative benefit review process through the
state Department of Labor and Workforce Development. 140 Only
after the benefit review conference proves fruitless may the
employee or employer file a complaint related to the claim in the
Circuit or Chancery Court.' 4 ' In Lynch, the court reversed the
42
holding of the trial court that this process was unconstitutional.
As to the separation of powers argument, the court stated that "the
benefit review conference does not substitute for a workers'
compensation action" and that "[t]he courts will ultimately
adjudicate a worker's claim if the case is not settled at the benefit
review conference."'143 Therefore, the court held that "the benefit
review process does not frustrate the adjudicative function of the
judicial branch."' 44 Thus, despite the court's strong language in
Mallard,it has consistently given leeway to the legislature to create
procedures consistent with the statutory purpose, at least in the

cannot obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.")).
136 Martin, 90 S.W.3d at 631.
137 Id. at 631-32.
138 Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384 (Tenn. 2006).
139 Id. at 388.
22
5(a)(1) (2005)).
140 Id. at 390-91 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-203(a), 50-6141 Id. at 391 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225(a)(2)(A) (2005)).
142 Id. at 389-90. In addition to concluding that the mandatory benefit review process
violated separation of powers principles, the trial court had also held that it violated the due
process and open courts protections of the Tennessee Constitutions. Id.
143 Id. at 393.
144

Id.
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area of workers' compensation law. 145

A recent per curiam opinion by the court 146 provides insight into
what might be a nascent conflict between the legislative and judicial
branches in Tennessee over workers' compensation law. Tennessee
Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) allows for either party in a
workers' compensation dispute to "request an independent medical
examiner from the commissioner's registry" if there is a dispute as
to the degree of the employee's medical impairment. 47 Under the
statute, this independent medical examiner's written impairment
rating "shall be presumed to be the accurate impairment rating;
provided, however, that this presumption may be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary."'148 In Mansell, the trial
court had granted the employee's motion to quash the employer's
request for an independent medical impairment rating, holding that
the statute applies only during the administrative review process
and not after a court acquires jurisdiction. 149 The court indicated
that to hold otherwise and prevent the court from choosing the
impairment rating would "usurpfD [a] judicial power that is basically
vested in [the court] once the law suit is filed."'150 On appeal, both
the employer and the Attorney General, as amicus curiae, argued
that the process "does not interfere with the adjudicative function"
because the presumption of correctness granted to the rating by the
statute may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 151 The
supreme court remanded to the trial court to allow the parties and
the Attorney General to more fully develop the record.152 The court
indicated, however, that it was interested in addressing the
constitutional issue by ordering that the hearing on remand occur
within ninety days and that any appeal of the trial court's judgment
be placed directly on the court's docket rather than being referred to
53
the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel.1
145 An exception to this came in 2003 when the court, citing its inherent power to
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure, held that the thirty-day period for filing a
notice of appeal in civil actions set forth in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 controls
whether or not a statistical data form is filed contemporaneously with the judgment, as
required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-244(b). See Corum v. Holston Health &
Rehab. Ctr., 104 S.W.3d 451, 454-55 (Tenn. 2003).
146 Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, No. M2010-02093-SC-R3-WC, 2011
WL 3758562 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011).
147 Id. at *1 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(d)(5) (2008 & Supp. 2010)).
14S Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-204(d)).
149 Id. at *2.
150 Id. at *3.

151 Id.
152

Id. at *5.

153 Id. (citing TENN. SUP. CT. R. 51, § 2).
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B. Source of Judicial Power over Rulemaking in Other Jurisdictions
While a separate and independent judiciary is an essential
component of the federal government and every state government,
the particular interplay among the branches differs from state to
state. The power of the judicial branch vis-A-vis the legislature
obviously manifests itself in the rulemaking process established in
each state.1 5 4 It is also helpful, however, to briefly survey other
jurisdictions for their view on the separation of powers provisions of
their constitutions and specifically, the ability of the legislatures in
those states to enact procedural rules.
In some states, the constitution expressly grants the power to
make rules of practice and procedure to the judiciary. The Arizona
Constitution, for example, grants to the Arizona Supreme Court the
"[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any
court."'155 Because of this constitutional power, "if the legislature
intrudes into the procedural realm, a question implicating the
separation of powers doctrine is raised." 156 Despite this broad grant
of power, the judiciary in Arizona will still conclude that the
legislature's action is permissible if it 'seem[s] reasonable and
workable"' and supplements, rather than contradicts, the existing
rules made by the court.1 57 However, the court draws the line
"when a conflict arises, or a statutory rule tends to engulf a general
rule of admissibility," such as when the legislature attempts to
repeal a rule of evidence or civil procedure. 158 In other words, the
Arizona legislature and supreme court "both have rulemaking
power, but... in the event of irreconcilable conflict between a
procedural statute and a rule, the rule prevails."159 Specifically,
"the legislature cannot enact a statute that 'provides an analytical
framework contrary to the [procedural] rules." '160 Other states with
like constitutional provisions have used similar language 1to
61
reaffirm the power of the judiciary over procedural rulemaking.
154 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. PARNESS & CHRIS A. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL
RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 22-64 (1973) (providing a state-by-state survey

of the rulemaking power).
155 ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 5(5).

156 Encinas v. Pompa, 939 P.2d 435, 437 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 3;
Pompa v. Superior Court, 931 P.2d 431, 433 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)).
157 State ex rel. Collins v. Seidel, 691 P.2d 678, 682 (Ariz. 1984); Encinas, 939 P.2d at 437.
158 Collins, 691 P.2d at 682.

159 Seisinger v. Siebel, 203 P.3d 483, 487 (Ariz. 2009).
160 Id. (quoting Barsema v. Susong, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (Ariz. 1988)).
161 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall prescribe the rules of
pleading, practice and procedure for all courts; provided these rules shall not abridge, enlarge
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In at least one state with such constitutional language, Florida, the
legislature has attempted to limit the state supreme court's power
to establish rules of practice and procedure through constitutional

amendment. 162
In other states, the constitution does not expressly grant the
power of procedural rulemaking to the courts, but the judiciary has
held that ability is a necessary corollary to the power that has been
granted to them by the people through the constitution. The
Kentucky Constitution, for example, simply states that the judicial
power shall be vested in the state supreme court and lower courts
and that "[tlhe court shall constitute a unified judicial system for
operation and administration."'1 63 Courts there have held that this
grant of the judicial power to the courts carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in
the administration of justice under the Constitution. Rules
of practice and procedure are, fundamentally, matters within
the judicial power and subject to the control of the courts in
the administration of justice. 164
Thus, the circumstance in Kentucky is comparable to that in
Tennessee: there is no express grant of power over practice and
procedure in the state constitution, but the judiciary has held that
or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this
Constitution."); Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408 (N.J. 1950) (quoting N.J. CONST. art.
3, which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the
VI, § 2,
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in
all such courts"); City of Fargo v. Ruether, 490 N.W.2d 481, 483 (N.D. 1992) (citing N.D.
CONST. art. 6, § 3, which gives the state supreme court "authority to promulgate rules of
procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all the courts of this state"). The
constitutions of at least two states, Alaska and Missouri, grant the state supreme court the
power to create procedural rules for "all courts and administrative tribunals," but reserves
some limited "veto power" to the legislature. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 ('The supreme
court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts [and]
governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be
changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house."); Mo.
CONST. art. 5, § 5 (stating that any procedural rule "may be annulled or amended in whole or
in part by a law limited to the purpose").
162 Gibeaut, supra note 20, at 44. The Florida Constitution states that "[tihe supreme
court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts" and that "rules [of court]
may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house
of the legislature." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). In 2011, the Florida legislature placed a
measure on the November 2012 ballot that "would lower the threshold needed to repeal a rule
of procedure to a 50 percent vote from the two-thirds majority now required." Gibeaut, supra
note 20, at 49; see also Initiatives/Amendments/Revisions, FLA. Div. OF ELECTIONS, June 21,
2011, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account-10&seqnum=81.
163 Ky. CONST. § 109.
164 Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Ky. 1938) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)
("The courts accept legislative co-operation in rendering the judiciary more effective. They
deny the right of legislative dominance in matters of this kind.").
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such power is necessary to the exercise of the inherent power that
165
does inure to the judiciary.
Even in states where the judiciary's power to enact rules of
practice and procedure is granted by statute, 166 and not expressly or
implicitly by the state constitution, the courts may vigorously stress
their power to regulate their own procedural rules. For example,
the Indiana Supreme Court has stated "that the procedural rules of
the judiciary, as promulgated from time to time by this Court, are
independent of legislative sanction." 167 On the one hand, this
stands for the proposition that if the court has "failed to speak" in a
particular area, then judicial procedure may be provided by
legislative enactment until such time as the court "elect[s] to alter
On the other hand, "[i]t is a
[it] or abrogate it by rule."'168
fundamental rule of law in Indiana that 'in the event of a conflict
between a procedural statute and a procedural rule adopted by the
supreme court, the latter shall take precedence." ' 169 The judicial
branches in other states also appear to have had the rulemaking
power expressly granted by statute, but those statutes arguably
recognize, rather than confer, the power.1 70 Tennessee, of course,
also has a statutory rulemaking procedure, but it is debatable
whether the court's authority to promulgate procedural1 7 rules
derives from its inherent powers or the legislative enactment. '
C. Application to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101
Do the decisions of the Tennessee courts and persuasive authority
from other jurisdictions provide any hint as to how the Tennessee
courts will respond to the new summary judgment legislation?
Perhaps, although examples of a state legislature's overruling of
either a rule of civil procedure or a judicial interpretation of such a
rule are exceedingly rare. 172 However, two major lessons can be
165 See also Hathcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d 844, 848 (Miss. 2005)
(interpreting the "judicial power" granted by MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 144, to include the ability
to regulate practice and procedure in the lower courts).
166 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-8-1-3 (West 2011).
167 State v. Bridenhager, 279 N.E.2d 794, 796 (nd. 1972).
168 Id.
169 Bowyer v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 798 N.E.2d 912, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Jackson v. City of Jeffersonville, 771 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind.Ct. App. 2002)).
170 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-212 (2012) (following a series of opinions in which the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized its inherent powers to promulgate rules of practice and procedure);

IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.4201 (Supp. 2012).

See infra Part IV.
One example of such legislative action comes from Massachusetts. In Bengar v. Clark
Equipment Co., 517 N.E.2d 1286, 1287 (Mass. 1988), the Supreme Judicial Court of
171
172
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gleaned from the separation of powers cases in Tennessee and
elsewhere.
On the one hand, the Tennessee courts have given the General
Assembly quite a bit of leeway to regulate procedure where the
legislature has established a statutory scheme, such as in workers'
compensation and some criminal cases. Even in spheres where the
courts are highly protective of their power, such as with their
regulation of attorneys, they have been willing to allow the
legislature to limit that power in order to protect the public. 173 It is
true that the legislature in Tennessee has, indeed, established a
174
statutory scheme with regard to procedural rulemaking.
However, the summary judgment legislation clearly exceeds that
power because it engages in the development of procedural rules
outside the process set forth by both custom and statute. 175 Thus,
the Tennessee courts are unlikely to view this as a circumstance in
which they would typically defer to the legislature to establish
176
procedural rules and standards.
On the other hand, courts are unlikely to sanction the exercise of
judicial review, or any of their other inherent judicial powers, by the
other two branches of government. 177 And the definition of

Massachusetts interpreted Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to prohibit an
amended complaint
to relate back to the date of the commencement of the action when ... the amendment
seeks to add a new defendant after the statute of limitations has run and to allege
against that new defendant a theory of liability wholly different from the theory of
liability of the original complaint.
Id. Shortly after Bengar was decided, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a revised
statute clarifying that such amendments were permissible and would relate back. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 51 (2000). "Given both the timing and the wording of the
enactment, it is obvious that the Legislature's intent was to overrule Bengar." Wood v.
Jaeger-Sykes, Inc., 536 N.E.2d 1100, 1102 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
173 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-101 to -4-105 (2009).
174 Id. §§ 16-3-401 to -408.
175 See infra Part IV.
176 Because Public Chapter Number 498 applies only to cases filed after July 1, 2011, there
has not yet been an opportunity for Tennessee's appellate courts to consider the
constitutionality of the act. The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently stated in dicta,
however, that "the legislative effort to dictate the practice and procedure to be followed by the
courts under these circumstances is inappropriate and unavailing due to the separation and
independent powers of the three branches of government." Lee v. Lyons Constr. Co., No.
2009-0263-11, at n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2011). Interestingly, this language was not
included in a superseding opinion filed less than a month later. See Lee v. Lyons Constr. Co.,
No. E2010-02388-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 57059 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012).
177 At the beginning of the 2012 legislative session, Sen. Mae Beavers (R-Mt. Juliet)
introduced Senate bill 2348, which would have abolished the Tennessee Supreme Court's
power of judicial review. S. 2348, 107th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Tenn. 2012) ('The supreme
court shall have no jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute which has been
properly enacted by the general assembly and become law in accordance with Article II,
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"inherent powers" in Tennessee appears, after Mallard, to include
any activities essential to perform the judicial function, including
procedural rulemaking. The courts in Tennessee do not have the
benefit of an explicit constitutional basis for the conclusion that
courts have the complete power over procedural rulemaking.
However, there is established precedent for the determination that
the ability to create and develop procedural rules is necessary to the
exercise of the courts' independent power under the Tennessee
Constitution, one which has a long history dating back to the 1835
constitution. 178
The language in Mallard is most instructive. A court's role in
determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment is
significantly different depending on whether it applies the Celotex
or Hannan standards. 179 The essential difference between the two
is the amount of evidence required at the summary judgment stage
for the moving party to shift the burden of production to the nonmovant and, ultimately, to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of material fact about each and every element of the claim.180
Although courts do not weigh the evidence at this stage, this
determination surely requires a judge "to hear facts ... and to
decide the questions of law involved."18 1 The imposition of a new
summary judgment standard, then, impairs a "court's constitutional
function to independently decide controversies." 18 2 Thus, the courts
could very well hold that the legislation exceeds the legislature's
constitutional authority by enacting "rules, either of evidence or
otherwise, that strike at the very heart of a court's exercise of
judicial power."' 8 3 Further, this is a circumstance where the courts
are unlikely to concede power to the legislature "purely out of

[section] 18 and Article 1II, [section] 18 of the Tennessee constitution."); see generally Bill
Raftery, Tennessee Bill Would End JudicialReview of All Statutes, But Loophole Might Allow
Court of Appeals & Court of Criminal Appeals to Hear Such Cases, GAVELTOGAVEL.US (Jan.
13, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2012/01/13/tennessee-bill-would-end-judicial-review-ofall-statutes-but-loophole -might-allow-court-of-appeals-court-of-criminal-appeals-to-hearsuchcases/ (noting that bill attempted to strip judicial review by statute rather than by
constitutional amendment as is being attempted in New Hampshire). Senator Beavers later
withdrew her bill under pressure from legislators in both parties. Erik Schelzig, Beavers
Jan.
23, 2012,
DESERET NEWS,
Withdraws Bill to Ban Judicial Review,
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700218240/Beavers-withdraws-bill-to-ban-judicial-review
.html.
178 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tenn. 2001).
179 See Blumstein, supranote 28, at 15-17.
180

Id.

181 Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 483
182 Id. (quotation omitted).

183Id. (citation omitted).

(quotation omitted).

2118

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 75.4

considerations of inter-branch comity," because that "courtesy does
18 4
not extend to the surrendering of judicial power."
D. The CurrentPolitical Climate in Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court's willingness to invalidate the
Public Chapter Number 498 may be affected by political realities.
On January 11, 2011, for the first time since Reconstruction, the
Tennessee General Assembly convened in Nashville with a
Republican majority in both houses.1 8 5 The newly inaugurated
Governor, Bill Haslam, was likewise a Republican. With this
triumvirate of Republican control, the General Assembly was free to
continue the business-friendly agenda it had begun under the
previous Governor, Democrat Phil Bredesen, and to intensify its
ongoing campaign against the perceived excesses of the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 8 6 Republican legislators sponsored employerfriendly changes in the workers' compensation scheme and passed
87
Most
statutes limiting monetary recovery by tort plaintiffs.
recently, in addition to their attempt to overturn the Hannan
summary judgment standard, the legislature has sought greater
power over the Court of the Judiciary. Underlying all these efforts
is the specter of the contested election of appellate judges, which in
recent years has hovered over all encounters between the supreme
court and the General Assembly. One legal seminar recently
posited that the Tennessee Supreme Court may hesitate to overturn
Public Chapter Number 498 because it is fearful of contested
88
judicial elections.
In 2004, the General Assembly enacted the Workers'
Compensation Reform Act of 2004, a massive overhaul of
Tennessee's workers' compensation system. 8 9 Most notably, the
Act required that injured workers first mediate their claims with
the Department of Labor before they could avail themselves of the
court system. 190
Likewise, the Act severely restricted injured

Id. at 482 (quotation omitted).
185 Sher, supra note 9.
186 See id.
187 Id.; Mike Morrow, Tort Reform Bill Passes Senate, TENN. REPORT (May 12, 2011),
http://tnreport.com/blog/2011/05/12/tort-reform-bill-passes-senate/.
188 David Johnson, Miller & Martin, Summary Judgment in Tennessee: How Legislative
Changes Benefit Employers, Continuing Legal Education seminar sponsored by Tennessee
Bar Association (July 14, 2011).
189 See Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 2004, ch. 962, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 2346.
184

190 See id.
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workers' potential recoveries. 191 During the 2011 session, the
General Assembly passed even more employer-friendly workers'
compensation legislation, 192 requiring that an injured worker's
treating physicians must "communicate" with and provide medical
records to the patient's employer, even if the employee specifically
requests otherwise, and redefining what injuries are compensable
through the workers' compensation scheme. 193 Further, on June 16,
2011, Governor Haslam signed into law the Tennessee Civil Justice
Act of 2011.194 This long-awaited tort reform measure 195 caps noneconomic damages for individual plaintiffs in most civil actions at
$750,000, and punitive damages at $500,000.196 Some members of
the legislature have complained that this tort reform did not go far
additional
enough to protect business interests in the state, and 97
reforms were enacted during the 2012 legislative session.
The General Assembly has also turned its attention to the Court
of the Judiciary. Established by statute, the court investigates
allegations of misconduct by Tennessee judges and imposes
discipline.198 The Court of the Judiciary has sixteen members: ten
judges appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, three members
appointed by the Tennessee Bar Association, and one member each
appointed by the Governor, the House speaker, and the Senate
speaker pro tempore. 199 As one commentator puts it, "the judicial
branch is in control." 20 0 The Court of the Judiciary was criticized by

191

Id.

See Act of June 6, 2011, ch. 416, 2011
http://www.tn.gov/sos/acts/107/pub/pc0416.pdf.
192

Tenn. Pub. Acts 1503, available at

193

Id.

194

Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, ch. 510, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts.

195 For the typical competing views on the desirability of so-called "tort reform" in

Tennessee, compare Mike Morrow, Talking Tort Reform, TENN. REPORT (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://tnreport.com/blog/2011/02/23/talking-tort-reform (reporting panel discussion by former
Mississippi state senator Charlie Ross, Vanderbilt Law School Professor James Blumstein,
and Ted Frank, adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute's Center for Legal Policy), with
Laura Thornquist, Tort Reform in TN a Solution Without a Problem, PUBLIC NEWS SERVICE
2011),
http://www.publicnewsservice.org/index.php?/content/article/19090-1
(Mar.
23,
(reporting on views of Tennessee Association for Justice, formerly the Tennessee Trial
Lawyers Association).
196 Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, ch. 510, § 10, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
197 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 27, 2012, ch. 1046, 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts (providing that the "loser
pays" all litigation costs, including the defendant's attorney's fees, when a complaint is
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
198 TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-5-101 (2009).
199Id.; see generally Walter T. Durham, Tennessee State Historian, TENNESSEE STATE
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES, http://www.tennessee.gov/tsla/history/tnhistorian/heritage.htm (last
visited Apr. 3, 2012) ("State lawmakers have left us the legacy of three states in oneTennessee divided into three grand divisions.").
200 Tom Humphrey, Tom Humphrey: Tennessee Leaders Struggle Over Who Judges the
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Republicans for failing to effectively police the judiciary, with critics
pointing to the fact that few complaints resulted in discipline, and
much of the discipline was issued in the form of private
reprimands. 20 1 In response, a Republican legislator introduced a
bill during the 2011 session to shrink membership on the Court of
the Judiciary to twelve, all of them appointed by either the House
speaker or the Senate pro tempore. 2 2 Under the Republican
proposal, "the Legislature would be in control." 20 3 Although a
compromise proposal was enacted in 2012, the legislature's
restructuring of the Court of the Judiciary is an additional example
of the tension between the legislative and judicial branches, and
represents "a fairly straightforward assault on the independence of
the judicial branch. 2 °4
Perhaps the most frightening political reality for the current
supreme court is the prospect of contested elections. Although
Tennessee's judicial retention elections are non-partisan, the

Judges, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/
201 l/aug/28/tennessee-leaders-struggle-over-who-judges-the/.
201 See id.
202 See id.
A minority of the members of the Court of the Judiciary-five of the twelve
appointees-would have been judges under Sen. Beavers' proposed legislation. Andrea
Zelinski, Judicial Ethics Panel Makeup Debated, TENN. REPORT (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://tnreport.comblog/2012/02/02/j udicial-ethics-panel-makeup-debated/.
203 Tom Humphrey, Tom Humphrey: Tennessee Leaders Struggle Over Who Judges the
Judges, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/
201 1/aug/28/Tennessee-leaders-struggle-over-who-judges-the/
(observing that the "bill is
largely founded on the premise that the judges can't be trusted to police themselves, and that,
to some, is at least pretty darned insulting-if not in violation of separation-of-powers
provisions of the state constitution."). Contributing to this legislative lack of faith in judicial
self-policing was the spectacular downfall of a Knox County, Tennessee, criminal court judge
in 2011. See Jamie Satterfield, Court of Secrecy: How Richard Baumgartner,a drug-addicted
judge, stayed on the bench despite warnings, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Feb. 12, 2012),
http://www.knoxnews.com /news/2012/feb/12/court-of-secrecy-how-baumgartner-was-allowedto/ (detailing saga of Judge Richard Baumgartner, who, having founded Knox County's Drug
Court, became addicted to prescription pain medication and used a female defendant in his
drug court as his supplier, resulting in new trials in high-profile murder cases over which he
had presided).
Ironically, unlike Tennessee's appellate judges, trial judges such as
Baumgartner are chosen by popular election. See id.
204 Tom Humphrey: Tennessee Leaders Struggle Over Who Judges the Judges, supra note
203. In the 2012 session, the General Assembly passed legislation replacing the Court of the
Judiciary with a Board of Judicial Conduct. Judges still constitute ten of the sixteen
members of the Board, but they will be appointed by various judicial organizations rather
than by the Tennessee Supreme Court and Tennessee Bar Association. The remaining six
members of the Board, three lawyers and three laypersons, will be appointed by the Governor
and the Speakers of the House and Senate. Additionally, the legislation introduced many
procedural changes to the disciplinary process for judges. See Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 819,
2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts; see also Lucas L. Johnson II, New Discipline Panel to Have More
Accountability (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/apr/15/new-disciplinepanel-to-have -more -accountability/.
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supreme court has historically been a Democratic bastion. 20 5 The
only Tennessee Supreme Court justice who has failed to win
retention under Tennessee's merit selection plan, Penny J. White,
was defeated by a concerted effort led by the Tennessee
Conservative Union, supported by state Republican leaders, who
painted her as a liberal extremist who put the rights of criminals
before the rights of victims. 20 6 The admitted goal of at least some of
those who promote contested elections is to influence the outcome of
judicial decisions. 20 7 The Lieutenant Governor and Speaker of the
Senate, Ron Ramsey, admits that the legislature is skeptical of the
current supreme court, noting that he hopes the present system,
with a Republican governor in place, will "mov[e] [the court] to the
208
right a little bit."
But the reality that contested judicial elections are costly has led
to an unlikely coalition between lawyers' groups and business
Contested elections are opposed by the Tennessee
advocates.
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Tennessee Business
Roundtable, and Tennesseans for Economic Growth, 20 9 who
undoubtedly see the cost of supporting candidates in judicial
elections as siphoning off money that could be used to support
candidates for other offices. But the message to the state supreme
court seems clear: Don't go too far to the left, or we will institute
contested elections and spend millions to defeat you. 210 It remains to

205 Between 1886 and 1998, sixty-three justices served on the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Of those sixty-three, only two were Republicans, with one Republican, George H. Brown, Jr.the first African-American to serve on the court-serving for less than one year in 1980. The
remaining sixty-one justices were Democrats, with three calling themselves "independent"
Democrats to denote their opposition to Democratic Governor Malcolm R. Patterson in the

1910 election.

See JAMES W. ELY, JR., A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 155,

190-01, 232, 271-77, 311 (2002).
206 Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary:Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for UnpopularDecision?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308,
310 (1997).
207 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 497 (noting with approval that "[judges] report on
surveys that the prospect of running in the referenda influences their decisions on the
bench."). The influence exerted on judges' decisions by their fear of losing the next election is
sometimes termed "democratic accountability." See, e.g., id. at 496-97.
208
209

Humphrey, supra note 10.
Id.

210 This message has been tempered somewhat by the General Assembly's recent adoption
of a resolution supporting a constitutional amendment that would combine the federal adviseand-consent model for nomination of judges with Tennessee's current practice of judicial
retention elections. See discussion, supra Part I & n.12-14. However, if the constitutional
amendment fails when placed on the ballot in 2014, as at least one commentator has
predicted, contested elections may be back on the table. See Cagle, supra note 14 ('The fact
remains that the constitution requires elected judges, and the people will likely vote to return
to the practice.").
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be seen what effect this threat will have on the courts' review of
Public Chapter Number 498.
IV. DOES THE ACT EXCEED THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S STATUTORY
POWER?

Regardless of whether Public Chapter Number 498 is
unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers clause, the
question arises of whether the act is void because it violates the
terms of the General Assembly's purported delegation of power to
the supreme court. Although the history of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4 makes it clear that Congress retains the power to
promulgate, or at least amend, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
outside the process enacted by the Rules Enabling Act, 211 the
situation in Tennessee is not so clear. To the extent that
Tennessee's system for promulgating the rules of practice and
procedure depends upon legislative delegation of power in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-403, the federal analogue is
persuasive. 212 But Tennessee's system also differs from the federal
system, not only because the General Assembly must actively
approve of all rules of civil procedure, but also because the
legislature has itself declared that the Tennessee Supreme Court's
power over procedure is "full, plenary, and discretionary." 213 Thus,
the General Assembly has assigned itself a role in the promulgation
and amendment of the rules of civil procedure, one which arguably
leaves no room for ad hoc rulemaking by the legislature, such as the
14
recent act purporting to overrule Hannan.2
The delegation issue can be analyzed in terms of three sequential
questions: (1) Did the General Assembly have any power to delegate
when it purported to delegate rulemaking power to the Tennessee
Supreme Court?; (2) If so, did it delegate all of its power, or did it
retain residual rulemaking power after the delegation?; and (3) If it
did retain any rulemaking power, did the General Assembly limit
its own exercise of that power by prescribing a limited role for itself
in the rulemaking process?
As to the first question-whether the General Assembly had any

211 See generally Kent Sinclair, Service of Process:Rethinking the Theory and Procedureof
Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1207-08 n.135 (1987); see
discussion supraPart III.
212 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-504 (2009).
213

Id.

214

Id.; see Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, § 1, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts.
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rulemaking power to delegate-the Tennessee Supreme Court has
made apparently conflicting statements. 2 15 The court has at times
identified the Rules as deriving from the joint power of the General
Assembly and the Tennessee Supreme Court. For example, in
Tennessee Department of Human Services v. Vaughn,216 the court
referred to the rules as "galvanized into law by joint judicial and
legislative action."21 7 Similarly, in Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience
Center,218 the court declared, "[t]he rules governing practice and
procedure in the trial and appellate courts of Tennessee were
promulgated by the General Assembly and the Supreme Court...
[and] have the force and effect of law." 219 More explicitly, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals has stated, "Those rules [of Civil
Procedure] were drafted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee under
authority delegated to the court by the Tennessee General
220
Assembly."
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has also insisted on its
own "inherent power to promulgate [the] rules," wholly apart from

215 Compare Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. 1980) with
State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473 (Tenn. 2001).
216 Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d 62. Vaughn is cited by one commentator for the proposition that a
constitutional challenge to the act "would not be an easy case to make." Blumstein, supra
note 28, at 18.
217 Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d at 63. This statement could be read as dicta, since the court's
holding rested on its determination that a statutory privilege against testifying granted to
defendants in bastardy proceedings violated both the United States and Tennessee
Constitutions. Id. at 71. The court's statement responded to a statement in the Court of
Appeals opinion that "Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure are not laws." Id. at 63. The full
statement, in the typically flowery language of Justice Henry, is as follows: "It ill behooves
any court-particularly an appellate court-to denigrate this trilogy of Rules [civil, criminal,
and evidence] galvanized into law by joint judicial and legislative action and marking the
methodology of trial and appellate practice under modern and enlightened Tennessee
jurisprudence." Id.
218 Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2002).
219 Id. at 713 (quoting Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn. 1980)). In this case,
there was no conflict between a statute and a rule of civil procedure. Cf. id. at 712. Instead,
the only issue was whether the statute of limitations had run when the plaintiff attempted to
take advantage of the savings statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-105 (2000), but had failed to
comply with the provisions of either TENN. R. Civ. P. 3 (requiring the renewal of process) or
TENN. R. CIV. P. 41.01 (requiring, upon filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal, service of the
complaint upon a party who had never been served with process). The court apparently
included this quote from its earlier decision in Crosslin, 594 S.W.2d at 380, in order to justify
its application of traditional statutory interpretation rules to TENN. R. CIV. P. 3. See also
Temlock v. McGinnis, 211 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Frye's statement
that Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure "have the force and effect of law" and concluding,
"[g]iven this, we will apply the same rules of construction [to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4] as we use to
interpret a statute").
220 Mid-South Pavers v. Arnco Constr., Inc., 771 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)
(citation omitted).
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any delegation of power by the General Assembly. 22 1 The case that
is most on point with the current state of the law is Mallard.222 As
noted earlier, the Mallard court insisted on its own inherent
rulemaking power. 223 However, the court also recognized a limited
role for legislative rulemaking:
The authority of the General Assembly to enact rules of
evidence in many circumstances is not questioned by this
Court. Its power in this regard, however, is not unlimited,
and any exercise of that power by the legislature must
inevitably yield when it seeks to govern the practice and
224
procedure of the courts.
Noting the fuzzy line between substance and procedure, the
supreme court elaborated on the respective powers of the General
Assembly and the court:
[W]e have frequently acknowledged the broad power of the
General Assembly to establish rules of evidence in
furtherance of its ability to enact substantive law. But, as the
General Assembly can constitutionally exercise only the
legislative power of the state, its broad ability to enact rules
for use in the courts must necessarily be confined to those
areas that are appropriate to the exercise of that power.
Although any discussion of the precise contours of this
legislative power is not appropriate in this case, it is
sufficient to acknowledge that such power exists and that it
is necessarily limited by the very nature of the power
225
itself.
Thus, although the court's analysis is less than pellucid, the court
appears to confine the General Assembly's rulemaking power to its
substantive legislative power. 226 In other words, the court seems to
deny to the General Assembly any freestanding rulemaking power
227
apart from the enactment of substantive law.
221
222
223
224

State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn. 2001).

Id.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 480.

225 Id.
at 481 (citing Daugherty v. State, 393 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tenn. 1965)) (emphasis
added).
226 It was this principle that presumably led Rep. Mike Stewart (D-Nashville) to state that,
while he understands the legislature's role in setting policy, the proposed legislation
overruling Hannan dealt with procedural rules, and was different from a statute creating
substantive law. Statement by Rep. Stewart, House Judiciary Committee, May 3, 2011,
available at http://tnga.granicus.comMediaPlayer.phpview-id=186&clip-id=419..
227 In a recent case, the Tennessee Supreme Court seemed to meld these two lines of
cases-joint power and inherent power-by asserting that the Rules of Civil Procedure "are
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If Tennessee's legislature lacks freestanding rulemaking
authority, it is less powerful than the United States Congress in
this regard. In at least three instances, Congress has passed
s
legislation inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22
The most notable instance of congressional rulemaking was its
treatment of amendments to Rule 4 in 1982, first passing legislation
to postpone the amendments proposed by the United States
Supreme Court and then drafting and passing its own version of the
amendments. 229 In none of these instances does it appear that a
challenge was raised to Congress's power to legislate rules. Indeed,
some scholars have asserted that the congressional delegation of
rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act
is unconstitutional because, in light of the practical inability to
separate procedure and substance, it permits the Supreme Court to
230
make substantive law.
Assuming that the Tennessee General Assembly had rulemaking
power to delegate in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-3-403,
The
does it retain any rulemaking power post-delegation?
rulemaking power of Congress may provide a valid analogue to the
post-delegation power of Tennessee's General Assembly. Like the
General Assembly, Congress has legislatively delegated the power
to promulgate rules of practice and procedure to the Supreme
Court. 231 And like the Tennessee General Assembly, Congress must
approve of proposed rules before they become effective. 232 However,
on the eve of the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Tennessee legislature, unlike Congress, expressly declared:
"This part shall constitute a broad conference of full, plenary and
promulgated by this court and approved by the General Assembly pursuant to this court's
'inherent power to promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts of this
state."' Hall v. Haynes, 319 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at
481).
228 See WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 30, at § 1001.
229 For the fascinating history of these amendments, see generally Sinclair, supra note 211.
230 See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules EnablingAct,
and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1303 (2006). In a variation on this theme, the former Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules has opined that the U.S. Supreme Court's "freewheeling
procedural rulemaking." Paul D.
rewriting of the Civil Rules" has precipitated a "crisis [in]
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J.
597, 600 (2010). Professor Carrington identifies pervasive changes to or (mis)readings of the
rules in an effort by the Supreme Court to "calm the unrest of those who saw themselves as
present or prospective defendants in civil cases." Id. at 613. Paralleling the situation
currently facing Tennessee, the modifications of the rules "conformi to the deregulation or
tort-reform politics favored by many business interests." Id. at 600.
231 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2011).
232 Id. § 2074.
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discretionary power upon the supreme court." 233 If "full" and
"plenary" power resides in the supreme court, it would seem that
the General Assembly can have no residual rulemaking power.
Nevertheless, in crafting the process by which the Rules of Civil
Procedure are promulgated, the General Assembly crafted a role for
itself. If Congress's negative veto power over the federal rules
indicates that rulemaking power originates in and remains with
Congress, 234 then the Tennessee General Assembly's role of giving
positive approval to the rules may indicate its ultimate power over
rulemaking. Indeed, in Tennessee, if rulemaking power inheres in
the supreme court, regardless of the statutory delegation, then it
seems illogical that the court submits its rules to the General
Assembly for approval. If the Tennessee General Assembly has no
power over rulemaking, then its approval of the court's rules would
seem to be, at best, superfluous.
Assuming, therefore, that the General Assembly retains some
power over rulemaking, what is the scope of that power? One
limitation on the General Assembly's power is found in the process
it has prescribed for promulgating the rules. The rules are initially
drafted by the Tennessee Supreme Court, but become effective only
235
after the General Assembly approves them by joint resolution.
Thus, the legislature has delimited its role in the rulemaking
process to one of approval only. It has not preserved for itself any
role in the process of making rules other than that of approving
rules drafted by the supreme court. 236 To the extent it might have
had power to engage in naked rulemaking prior to the delegation, it
has instead chosen to confine its role to approval of rules presented

233 TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-504 (2009).
234 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 1001 ("[T]he weight of authority in this country
supports the right of Congress to prescribe rules of judicial procedure for the federal courts.").
235

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401 to -403 (2009). TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-406 (2009)

provides: "After the rules have become effective, all laws in conflict with the rules shall be of
no further force or effect." Quoting this language, Don Paine observes: "It is noteworthy that
no Code section provides for nullification of a Supreme Court rule by subsequent legislation
on the same subject." Paine, Can the General Assembly Overrule Supreme Court Rules?,
supra note 112, at 37.
236 Recently, the supreme court, recognizing the delineation of authority in the rulemaking
process, declined to interpret one of the discovery rules in a way that was inconsistent with
legislative history, despite the fact that Tennessee is in the extreme minority of jurisdictions
on the issue. Instead, it deferred to the rulemaking process and simply expressed its
preference for Tennessee to join other states in following changes in the corresponding federal
rule. See Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tenn. 2009). Similarly, in Webb, the
supreme court declined to adopt the federal "plausibility" pleading standard by judicial
decision, instead deferring to the rulemaking process. Webb v. Nashville Habitat for
Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424, (Tenn. 2011).
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to it. This interpretation of the General Assembly's residual power
harmonizes with its grant of "full" and "plenary" power to the
Within Tennessee's statutory rulemaking
supreme court. 237
scheme, the supreme court wields "full" and "plenary" power to
write the rules; the General Assembly's only power is one of
approval or disapproval.
This interpretation, however logical, seems to be challenged by
the declaration of the supreme court in Tennessee Dep't of Human
Services v. Vaughn that
[t]hese rules [the Rules of Civil Procedure], along with the
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, are "laws" of this state, in full force and effect,
until such time as they are superseded by legislative
enactment or inconsistent rules promulgated by this court
238
and adopted by the General Assembly.
This quote from Vaughn, which is not part of the court's holding
but responds only to the court of appeals' erroneous assertion that
the "Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure are not laws[, ' ' 23 9 has been
relied on by lower courts for the proposition that "[t]he Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure are 'laws' and are subject to being
If this
superseded in the same manner as statutes." 240
interpretation of Vaughn's declaration is valid, then presumably the
General Assembly can make and amend court rules at will.
However, it appears that the statement in Vaughn simply refers to
the status of the rules and the necessity for the courts to interpret
them just as any other 'laws" would be interpreted.
As noted, the supreme court in Mallard suggested another
boundary. Namely, the General Assembly's power over court rules
extends only to matters of substance: "[W]e have frequently
acknowledged the broad power of the General Assembly to establish
rules of evidence in furtherance of its ability to enact substantive
law." 24 1 It is not clear precisely what type of substance-based or
substance-linked rule the court had in mind-the court gave no

237

TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-504.

238 Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tenn. 1980). Professor
Don Paine opined in December 2011 that when Justice Henry wrote this "dictum" in Vaughn,
he did so "mistakenly." Paine, Can the General Assembly Overrule Supreme Court Rules?,
supranote 112, at 37.
239 Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d at 63.
240 Lady v. Kregger, 747 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). This quote has also been
relied upon by one commentator, who asserts that a challenge to the constitutionality of
Public Act 498 "[will] not be an easy [one] to make." Blumstein, supranote 28, at 18.
241 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tenn. 2001).
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example of such a rule-but a court of appeals case may provide an
example. In Lady v. Kregger,242 the court of appeals addressed a
clear conflict between the service provisions of Tennessee's
uninsured motorist statute and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, governing service
of process. 243 The court's resolution of the conflict seems to reflect
the Mallard court's suggestion that the legislature has the power to
make only substance-specific rules. The court held that "[t]he
intention of the Legislature in enacting [the uninsured motorist
statute] was to provide an efficient procedure whereby the Plaintiffs
could obtain complete relief when injured by an uninsured
motorist." 244 The court's reasoning was two-pronged. First, the
court reasoned that "[sluspension of the T.R.C.P. Rule 3
requirement[s] ... is consistent with the legislative intent to
provide an efficient procedure." 245 Second, the court quoted a
general provision of the Tennessee Code Annotated: "If provisions of
different titles or chapters of the code appear to contravene each
other, the provisions of each title or chapter shall prevail as to all
matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that title
or chapter."

246

Treating the Rules of Civil Procedure as "laws" subject to
interpretation pursuant to this section, the court held that "the
specific provisions in [the uninsured motorist statute] prevail over

the conflicting general provisions in T.R.C.P. Rule

3."247

Several

points are noteworthy here. First, the statutory service provisions
applied only to one type of action: suit against an uninsured
motorist carrier. 248 Second, the court discerned a clear substancerelated purpose for the procedural provision: providing an efficient
reissuance
than the cumbersome
efficient
remedy-more
requirements of Rule 3-for plaintiffs injured by uninsured
motorists. 249 Finally, the court applied the canon of statutory
construction that "the specific controls the general" to give effect to
the substance-related statutory provision. 250 Thus, the Lady court's

Lady, 747 S.W.2d at 342.
Id. at 343. Specifically, the statute permitted service upon the plaintiffs uninsured
motorist carrier without compliance with Rule 3's "requirement that new process be issued
every six months or the action be refiled yearly." Id. at 345.
244 Id. at 345.
242
243

245

Id.

246

Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-103) (emphasis added).

247

Id.

248
249

Id. at 344.
See id. at 345.

250

Id.
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resolution of the conflict indicates that the substance-related
rulemaking power acknowledged by the Mallard court probably
refers to substance-specific procedures.
Public Chapter Number 498 does not qualify as the sort of
substance-specific rule to which legislative power extends. The Act
sets a new standard for granting summary judgment that is transsubstantive-applicable to any civil action, rather than limited to a
specific type of action. Because summary judgment involves only
the evaluation of claims and evidence, and by definition, involves no
evaluation of the substance of a claim, a change in the summary
judgment standard could not be classified as substantive. 251 Public
Chapter Number 498 fails the Mallard court's definition of valid
legislative rulemaking.
No Tennessee court has ever held that a Rule of Civil Procedure
could be legislatively overruled. In every case in which a statute
and a court rule were alleged to conflict, the Tennessee courts have
harmonized the two, sometimes giving effect to the statute and
sometimes to the rule. For example, in State ex rel. Leech v.
Wright,252 a suit seeking ouster of the Lincoln County Road
Commissioner, the supreme court stated that "if there is any
conflict between any express provision of the ouster statutes and
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the ouster statute should
prevail."253 Nevertheless, the court read the ouster statute as
governing only amendments to the form of the complaint, holding
that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs substantive
amendments and reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to
In Mid-South Pavers v. Arnco Construction, the
amend. 254
Tennessee Court of Appeals harmonized the statute governing
revivor of actions with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 by
holding that Rule 25.01 sets forth the first step in the revivor
process, while the statute prescribes the second step in the
process. 255 Therefore, the plaintiff should have complied with both
251 Of course, Tennessee's summary judgment standard may well be "substantive" for Erie
purposes. See Matthew R. Lyon, Shady Grove, the Rules EnablingAct, and the Application of
State Summary Judgment Standards in FederalDiversity Cases, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1011,
1052-53 (2011) (arguing that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state summary
judgment standards where those standards diverge from the federal Celotex standard).
252 State ex rel. Leech v. Wright, 622 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. 1981).
253 Id. at 810-11.
254 Id. at 811. See also Frye, 70 S.W.3d at 716 (stating "we must construe Rules 3 and
41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and the Tennessee saving statute together in
a working order" and reading the language of the statute to require compliance with Rule 3).
255 Mid-South Pavers, Inc. v. Arnco Constr., Inc., 771 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989).
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the rule and the statute to effectively revive its action. 256
These efforts by the courts to harmonize apparently conflicting
statutes and court rules are consistent with the Mallard court's
restrained approach to inter-branch comity. Unfortunately, it is
doubtful that Public Chapter Number 498 can be saved by
resourceful reading. First, the statute purports to establish an
entirely novel standard for summary judgment: the statute provides
257
that the movant "shall prevail" if it meets the Celotex standard.
Read literally, this enactment provides no opportunity for the
nonmovant to respond to the movant's showing. The Hannan
standard merely prescribes the showing necessary for the movant to
shift the burden of production to the nonmovant; it does not permit
the movant to "prevail" regardless of any showing by the
nonmovant. 258 This difficulty might be overcome by resourceful
reading, 259 but if the Tennessee Supreme Court is faced with one of
the very rare cases in which the second prong of the Hannan test is
implicated, 260 there appears to be no way to harmonize the statute
and the Hannan standard other than by reinserting the two words
"at trial" into the second prong.
In summary, then, the General Assembly's attempt to amend
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in Public Chapter Number
498 probably exceeded its power under the statutory scheme for the
promulgation and amendment of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure. In light of the supreme court's "full, plenary and
discretionary power" within the statutory scheme, there is no
residual power in the legislature to enact rules of practice and
procedure for the courts. Because the legislature's only role within

Specifically, the court held that Rule 25.01 changed the statutory scheme from a
256 Id.
requirement of consent or scire facias to a simple motion and order of substitution of parties.
However, the second statutory step-filing the order in duplicate in the probate court-was
not addressed by the rule; therefore, that portion of the statute must still be complied with.

Id.

.
Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, § 1, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts
At least one commentator has glossed over this distinction by asserting that both Byrd
and Hannan set the standard by which the movant should prevail, rather than simply
articulating the movant's initial burden of production. See Blumstein, supra note 28, at 16
(chart comparing Byrd, Hannan, and Public Chapter Number 498).
259 The court might read the poorly drafted statute to merely reflect the legislature's
intention that the movant can "shift the burden of production to the nonmovant" by
complying with either of the statutory prongs. This charitable reading is arguably no more
extreme than the Mallard court's willingness to read the verb "shall" as "should." See supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
260 See generally Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of Byrd v. Hall. Gossiping About Summary
Judgment in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV. 175 (2001) (discussing why the Hannan standard
will arise very rarely in summary judgment practice).
257
258
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this statutory scheme is to approve rules of civil procedure
promulgated by the supreme court, it has no power to create rules
outside this process. 261 Although, as the Mallard court recognized
and the Lady court held, the legislature can validly enact
substance-specific rules of procedure, Public Chapter Number 498 is
trans-substantive. 262
V. CONCLUSION

The current situation in Tennessee is a vivid illustration of how
the mere threat of contested judicial elections can affect the legal
climate. The legislature's attempt to amend Tennessee's summary
judgment rule, or to overrule the Tennessee Supreme Court's
interpretation of it, all while circumventing the established
rulemaking process, adumbrates much larger issues about the
independence of the judicial branch. Legal arguments can be made
about the validity of Public Chapter Number 498-it violates the
separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution; it
trenches upon the inherent powers of the Tennessee Supreme
Court; it runs afoul of the statutory process that by definition
delimits the Tennessee General Assembly's power to make rules of
But the real battle being fought in
practice and procedure.
Tennessee is not one between Celotex and Hannan-it is, as the
Mallardcourt put it, a battle between "courtesy" and "concession."

261 Notably, during the very brief debate over the legislation on the floor of the Tennessee
Senate, Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson) implored the sponsor, Sen. Brian Kelsey (RGermantown) to allow the Rules Committee the opportunity to review the bill before passage.
at
available
20,
2011,
Floor,
May
Senate
Sen.
Finney,
of
Statement
Kelsey
Sen.
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?viewid=186&clipid=43288.
responded that the because the bill had been introduced months earlier, the Tennessee Bar
Association had the opportunity to take it to the Rules Committee, but had not done so, and
at any rate, it was unnecessary for the Rules Committee to review it. Statement of Sen.
Kelsey, Senate Floor, May 20, 2011, available at http://tnga.granicus.comMediaPlayer
.php?view id=186&clipid=43288.
262 Although one commentator has sought to relate Public Chapter Number 498 to tort
reform measures passed during the same legislative session, the legislature itself made no
reference to tort reform in the preamble to the bill that was eventually enacted, undermining
any argument that the act had a substance-specific purpose. See Blumstein, supranote 28, at

17.

